ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. We find that, relative to matched control firms, businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund intervention, but experience increases in tax avoidance after the intervention. Moreover, findings suggest that the increase in tax avoidance is greater when activists have a successful track record of implementing tax changes and possess tax interest or knowledge as indicated by their SEC 13D filings. We also find that these greater tax savings do not appear to result from an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax strategies, such as sheltering. Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder monitoring of firms, in the form of hedge fund activism, improves tax efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Ownership structure is an important but under-studied determinant of corporate tax policies (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001) . Only recently have a few studies started to explore this area (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2010a and 2010b; Chen et al. 2010) . This paper extends the literature by examining the role of hedge fund activists on the levels of corporate tax avoidance.
Hedge fund activists have been playing an increasingly important role in capital markets and prompting profound changes in the way the corporate world operates (Kahan and Rock 2007; Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009; Brav et al. 2010 ).
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In this paper, we investigate whether this important and unique class of shareholders has any impact on corporate tax planning efficiency.
There is significant variation in the level of corporate tax avoidance across publiclytraded firms (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008) . While some of this variation is attributable to size and industry factors, a significant portion remains unexplained. One potential source for the unexplained variation could be due to differences in firm managers' incentives for tax planning.
That is, managers' preference to limit the effort and risk associated with tax planning might contribute to the observed low levels of tax avoidance for some firms. Hedge fund activists can provide informed monitoring by pushing effort-averse firm managers to improve tax planning efficiency. Hedge fund activists also tend to have concentrated investment portfolios, and the performance of an individual firm may significantly impact their portfolio returns (Kahan and 1 This literature finds that hedge fund activists are successful in eliciting positive changes in target firms' corporate governance, business policies, and financial performance. For instance, prior studies document increases in dividend payout, CEO turnover, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and board representation in the target firms after hedge fund interventions. Please refer to Brav et al. (2010) for a detailed review. Rock 2007; Brav et al. 2008) . As a result, hedge fund activists have an incentive to exercise their influence to encourage individual firms to employ tax avoidance strategies that enhance after-tax cash flows and firm value.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms targeted by hedge funds tend to be tax inefficient, and activist hedge funds often demand efficiency improvements in tax and other areas from these target firms. For instance, in 2007 the hedge fund Third Point LLC targeted PDL Biopharma Inc., aiming to change the firm's business strategies and to remove its CEO, Mark McDade.
When making its case to the board of directors, Third Point wrote: "Mr. McDade lacks the ability to communicate with the investment community effectively in part because he has a poor understanding of even basic financial concepts… He readily admitted to us that he has not properly thought through nor effectively utilized PDL's tax credits, which has and will result in reduced value for PDL shareholders" (Third Point LLC vs. PDL Biopharma 2007) . Calling the unused tax credits a "readily exploitable Company asset," Third Point identifies the firm's tax strategy as a potential source of value improvement. In another example, in October 2007 hedge fund activist Sandell Asset Management Corp. recommended to the target firm, Sybase Inc., that improving tax efficiency would provide opportunities for value creation. Specifically, the hedge fund activist stated that "Given the company's stable base of maintenance revenue, a moderate level of leverage is more tax efficient and will improve returns on equity." 2 In this study, we collect a large sample of 2,981 hedge fund activist events from 1994 to 2008, using a hedge fund's filing of Schedule 13D as the initiation of hedge fund activism (Brav et al. 2008; Greenwood and Schor 2009; Klein and Zur 2009) . We define tax avoidance as activities that reduce explicit taxes per dollar of pre-tax accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) , and infer a target firm's tax avoidance level from four commonly-used metrics. 3 The first two metrics, based on effective tax rates (ETR), are measured as a firm's income tax expense and cash taxes paid scaled by pretax income, respectively. The other two measures reflect differences between a firm's reported income and taxable income (book-tax difference, or BTD.) They are the Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference, and a derivative BTD measure proposed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to capture differences resulting mainly from tax planning. To control for the endogeneity of hedge funds' targeting decisions and market-wide changes in tax avoidance, we follow prior studies (e.g., Li and Prabhala 2007; Lawrence et al. 2011 ) and use the propensity-score matching method to construct a sample of control firms. The propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from a logistic regression model as in Brav et al. (2008) . We adjust the values of all variables used in the analysis by subtracting the corresponding value for the matched firm from that for the sample firm and use the differences for our empirical analysis. In the baseline analysis, we find that target firms have lower tax avoidance levels than control firms before hedge fund intervention. We also find that target firms experience increases in tax avoidance after the fund intervention compared with the matched control firms. 3 To avoid the complexity of determining the legality or appropriateness of the mechanism used to reduce the tax burden, we follow the literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and define tax avoidance as a broad description of tax strategies that reduce taxes relative to book income rather than a narrower construct such as tax evasion.
Because hedge fund interventions are often associated with profound and multidimensional effects on target firms (Brav. et al. 2010) , it is possible that indirect effects, arising from changes in other tax determinants such as operating, financing and investment activities, drive the observed changes in tax avoidance. To isolate direct effects of hedge fund activists on corporate tax avoidance, we conduct several tests to adjust for such indirect effects. First, we construct various control samples matched on changes in operating, financing and investment activities and find these control samples do not experience similar increases in tax avoidance as target firms. Second, we employ a multivariate regression approach that explicitly controls for other determinants of tax avoidance that may give rise to the indirect effects. We continue to find consistent results. Finally, we find that increases in tax avoidance in target firms depend on the associated hedge funds' past success in implementing tax changes. In addition, we create proxies for fund activists' interest in, and knowledge of, tax issues from their SEC filings. Using these proxies, we document a link between such fund characteristics and changes in target firms' tax avoidance.
We also conduct several additional analyses. Extending the event window, we find that increases in tax avoidance for target firms do not reverse over the five-year period after the intervention, consistent with hedge fund activists inducing at least intermediate-term changes in firms' tax strategies. Further, we analyze whether target firms' increased tax avoidance is associated with an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax planning strategies (e.g., tax sheltering). Using sheltering estimates from Wilson's (2009) and Lisowsky's (2010) sheltering models, we find no evidence that target firms are more likely to engage in tax sheltering after hedge fund intervention.
An alternative explanation for our results is that hedge fund activists could just be cherrypicking target firms that are already improving their tax avoidance. To address this concern, we conduct trend analyses and find that on average the target firms were experiencing a decreasing trend in tax avoidance prior to the activist event, while control firms do not exhibit this pattern.
Collectively, our results suggest that the observed increases in target firms' tax avoidance levels are partially attributable to the direct effects of hedge fund activists on target firms' tax planning.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the growing literature on the effect of ownership structure on corporate tax avoidance. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to document that hedge fund activists induce increases in target firms' tax avoidance. Second, we contribute to the current literature on the effect of hedge fund activists on target firms. Specifically, we find that the increases in tax avoidance are related to hedge fund characteristics (e.g., their past success, interest, and knowledge in target firms' tax planning) and there is no evidence of tax sheltering. These findings suggest that hedge funds' informed monitoring is associated with improvements in target firms' tax efficiencies, which increase both cash flows and firm value. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and variable measurement. Section 4 presents the primary results of the study, while Section 5 reports additional tests and the sensitivity of the results to alternative tests and specifications. Section 6 concludes. 4 In untabulated results we find that the increase in tax avoidance following the intervention is positively associated with an increase in targets' valuation as measured by Tobin's Q and abnormal returns.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A number of recent papers identify hedge fund activism as an effective influence on shareholder monitoring by providing evidence of post-intervention improvements in governance structure, capital structure, and operational decisions. Brav et al. (2008) find that hedge funds are successful in mitigating agency costs and improving firm value. Target firms in their sample experience increases in payout, higher rates of CEO turnover, and improvements in operating performance and corporate governance. Similarly, Klein and Zur (2009) report that hedge fund activists are successful in pressing target firms to repurchase stock, replace CEOs, and increase board representation of the funds. Bratton (2006) , Briggs (2007) , and Clifford (2008) show that hedge fund activists improve their target firms' short-term and long-term performance. Greenwood and Schor (2009) , on the other hand, attribute positive returns of target firms to hedge funds' ability to force target firms into a takeover.
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Building upon this literature, we argue that hedge fund activists have the incentive and the ability to influence their target firms' tax avoidance activities. First, compared with other institutions, hedge fund activists have stronger incentive to engage in costly monitoring activities since they are less susceptible to the free-rider problem and fund managers have stronger compensation incentives. Hedge funds are largely unregulated and are not subject to the "prudent man" rule, allowing them to accumulate a large stake in an individual company (Clifford 2008) .
As a result, hedge funds have incentive to undertake monitoring activities to improve the operational performance of target firms so that their marginal returns from the improved firm governance and performance exceed their monitoring costs. In addition, hedge fund managers' 5 Brav et al. (2008) also argue that hedge fund activists are not short-term focused. Such funds have an average holding period of about 20 months and their positive impact on the target firm does not fully dissipate even after the fund's exit. 6 Most of these studies suggest that positive market returns are due to fundamental improvements in firm practices elicited by hedge fund intervention. To the best of our knowledge, Greenwood and Schor (2009) is the only paper that attributes the documented positive returns of target firms to the ability of hedge funds to involve target firms as objects of takeover activity.
pay depends largely on their funds' absolute returns (Kahan and Rock 2007) . A hedge fund can invest a large proportion of its wealth in individual firms and has incentives to influence individual firms' operations, such as reducing tax payments, to generate improved returns.
Second, increases in tax avoidance can help hedge funds to achieve their goal of improving firm value. One important source of gains from intervention comes from the economic benefits of constraining inefficient managerial actions (Maug 1998; Gillan and Starks 2000) . Tax avoidance increases firm value by generating tax savings that potentially improve accounting earnings and cash flows (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) , which should benefit hedge fund activists and increase the value of their investments. With statutory tax rates often in excess of one third of a company's profits, tax avoidance provides a significant opportunity for hedge fund activists to increase free cash flow, firm value, and the value of their investments.
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Hedge fund activists also have the ability to push for more efficient tax management through their enhanced monitoring. They can set 'the tone at the top', analogous to the effect of top managers on tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2010) , by emphasizing the importance of tax planning to the target firm. In addition, prior literature finds that hedge funds achieve significant success in promoting corporate changes (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) . Hedge funds have relatively high percentages of ownership and can use leverage and derivative instruments to obtain beneficial ownerships or voting rights (Hu and Black 2006) . They can exercise their shareholder rights to nominate and elect board members, sponsor shareholder proposals, and launch proxy fights (Bratton 2006; Briggs 2007; Klein and Zur 2009) . They also frequently use 7 Assuming that tax planning generates economic benefits, one might ask why target firm managers do not always engage in such planning. There are frictions that could induce inefficiency in tax planning of our target firms. For example, prior literature suggests that target firm managers lack adequate incentive to maximize firm value (e.g., Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) . Target firms may underinvest in tax planning even though it is valueenhancing. Hedge fund activism can help alleviate this friction. Brav et al. (2008) find hedge fund activism increases pay-for-performance sensitivities for corporate executives, providing stronger incentives for effort-averse managers to improve tax planning (Hanlon et al. 2005) . public media to push for corporate changes and cooperate with other institutional investors to make their interventions successful (Brav et al. 2008) . Therefore, managers of target firms have incentives to meet hedge funds' demands for more efficient tax planning. In summary, hedge fund activists' strengthened monitoring of effort-averse firm managers could improve target firms' tax planning.
Anecdotal evidence supports this perspective. When targeting BNS Co. in 2002, hedge fund Hummingbird Management, LLC stated:
Our motivation is purely financial; we only seek to maximize returns from our investment. The important goals are to maximize returns on remaining assets while minimizing taxes and ongoing costs, thereby maximizing the ultimate cash payment, to the owners of the company (Hummingbird vs. BNS Co. 2002). 8 This activist statement is consistent with hedge fund activists' intent to improve tax planning to increase firm value. In this filing, Hummingbird also proposes the following specific change in tax strategies, exhibiting its knowledge and interest in tax planning:
We feel that efforts should be made to fully utilize the company's NOL (net operating loss). Using the NOL to shield income thrown off from the building and from the proceeds from asset sales would minimize tax expense to the company.
We provide additional anecdotal evidence that activist funds recognize the importance of target firm tax strategy in Appendix A. Based on the above discussions regarding hedge funds activists' incentive and ability to influence their target firms' tax avoidance activities, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Firms targeted in hedge fund activism exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance after the activist event.
III. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

Sample Selection
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) , we construct our hedge fund sample from Schedule 13D filings. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires investors who acquire a 5 percent or greater stake in a publicly traded firm to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC within 10 days and declare any intentions to influence the firm's management.
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In addition, these investors should use Schedule 13D/A to report material changes in a held position.
We start our sample collection by obtaining all Schedule 13D and 13D/A filings between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2008 from the EDGAR database of the SEC. We start from 1994 because company filings in the SEC EDGAR database were sporadic before 1994 (see http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm). In addition, the use of a post-1993 sample ensures the consistency in the accounting treatments for income taxes for our sample period due to the issuance of FAS 109 effective in 1993. From each filing we collect the filing date, the name of the filer, and the name of the identified target. The filers are then matched with a comprehensive list of hedge funds to identify Schedule 13D and 13D/A filings by hedge funds.
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Our sample includes 435 activist hedge funds and 2,981 activist events in the period 1994-2008. Table 1 Panel A shows the distribution of hedge fund activist events by year. There is an increasing trend in the number of hedge fund activist events over time. In Panel B, we present the frequency of participation by hedge funds. A majority (60.69 percent) of funds are involved in no more than three activist events in the sample period, while 14.94 percent engage in more than ten activist events in the period. This result suggests that while the majority of hedge funds 9 When the investor has no intention to influence firm management, she should file Schedule 13G instead of 13D. 10 We are grateful to Wei Jiang for sharing the list of 236 hedge fund activists used in Brav et al. (2008) . We also thank Fei Pan for sharing a list of hedge funds collected from four hedge fund databases: Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services (TASS), HedgeFund.Net (HFN), Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM), and HedgeFund Intelligence.
do not engage in activism on a regular basis, some do so frequently. In Panel C, we show the industry distribution of the target firms based on two-digit SIC industry classification. Prior literature finds cross-industry variation in firms' effective tax rates, suggesting that industry differences may partially explain differences in levels of tax avoidance among firms. Therefore, we include industry dummies in each of our primary tests to control for industry effects. In the empirical analysis, we exclude target firms in financial and utility industries since they have unique accounting requirements and regulatory environments (Hanlon 2005) .
Variable Construction
In addition to hedge fund activism data, we obtain the required financial statement data from Compustat, institutional ownership data from Thomson's 13F database, and daily stock return data from CRSP. Appendix B provides a detailed definition of each variable used in our empirical analysis. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for caution with respect to the selection of tax avoidance measures. In particular, they note that different empirical metrics computed from the financial statements capture different aspects of a firm's tax strategy. Certain empirical measures do not consistently reflect the impact of tax strategies that permanently reduce tax liability (e.g., debt tax shields) versus other strategies that simply defer taxes to future periods (e.g., accelerated depreciation). While we maintain our focus on tax avoidance, as opposed to more extreme tax aggressiveness, we make no formal hypotheses on the types or mechanisms of avoidance in which target firms engage. As such, we consider four broad constructs of tax avoidance that are well established in the literature, and in particular, are consistent with other studies examining tax avoidance in the agency cost context Dharmapala 2006, 2009; Chen et al. 2010 Dyreng et al. (2008) show that the one-year cash ETR measure is an unreliable measure of long-run tax avoidance with evidence of low correlation between one-year rates with rates calculated over five and ten year periods, but do not suggest the short-run measure is without merit. For our event study research setting, one-year measures appear to be more appropriate for the examination of year-to-year changes in tax avoidance. In addition, in the context of an event study, finding changes in a long-run cash effective tax rate would be difficult because years prior to the event will still be more heavily weighted in the avoidance measures for the post-intervention years. Finally, the robust results across the three additional metrics should partially mitigate the concern over the validity of one-year measure of cash ETR. Alternatively, we estimate three-year cash ETRs before and after the hedge fund intervention, respectively, and find our inferences are unaltered. 14 There are several reasons why hedge funds tend to target smaller firms with minimum foreign activities. First, these firms have fewer resources for value-enhancing activities such as tax avoidance and thus could benefit more from hedge fund interventions. Second, fund activists are better able to influence and implement business strategies in firms that are small and less complex than multinational firms.
directly comparable to prior literature (e.g., Dharmapala 2006, 2009; Chen et al. 2010Large values of MP_BTD indicate greater levels of tax avoidance.
MP_BTD captures tax strategies that lead to both permanent and temporary differences between book income and taxable income. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) note that federal tax expense, used to calculate taxable domestic income, is affected by income-changing discretionary accruals used for earnings management purposes. To mitigate the influence of earnings management strategies on book-tax differences, they compute an alternative book-tax difference metric by regressing MP_BTD on total accruals (TA) measured using the cash flow method suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002) :
The residual of this regression (ε), which is expected to be largely free of earnings management (or at least accruals management), is the Desai-Dharmapala book-tax difference (DD_BTD).
Similar to MP_BTD, larger values of DD_BTD imply greater levels of tax avoidance.
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There are limitations associated with empirical tax avoidance measures, including those used in our study. First, as noted by Bernard (1984) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , these measures do not capture conforming tax avoidance, or those strategies reducing both book and taxable income such as debt interest. Second, measures of book-tax differences are essentially an "ETR differential", reflecting the difference between the statutory tax rate and the GAAP ETR since taxable income is estimated by "grossing up" reported tax expense by the statutory tax rate (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 142) . These four measures are not independent and therefore neither are the corresponding tests based on these measures.
IV. PRIMARY RESULTS
15 μ i is used to indicate the firm fixed-effect. 16 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide a comprehensive discussion of these and other tax avoidance measures. Brav et al. (2008) show that hedge fund activists select their target firms based on certain firm characteristics. Our results will be biased if these ex ante characteristics of target firms lead to future increases in our tax avoidance measures even without the hedge fund intervention.
Propensity Score Matching
Another concern is that a contemporaneous upward trend in tax avoidance occurring to all firms drives our results. To control for a potential selection bias and market-wide changes of tax avoidance, we use the propensity score matching method to construct a sample of control firms.
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The propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund target in the next year, estimated from a logistic regression model as in Table IV of Brav et al. (2008) .
Specifically, we regress a dummy variable of being targeted by hedge funds on the lagged values of firm size, Tobin's Q, sales growth, return on assets, debt-to-equity ratio, annual dividend yield, R&D expense, Herfindahl index, number of analysts following the firm, percentage of institutional ownership, and year dummies.
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We estimate this logistic regression for all firms in the Compustat database with available data from 1994 to 2008 and then use the obtained coefficients to estimate the propensity score for each firm. Table 2 provides univariate tests of tax avoidance for target firms surrounding hedge fund activist events. For each measure, we present the mean adjusted annual levels from the year prior to the activist event to the second year after the event (event year 0 being the year of the intervention announcement) as well as the changes in these adjusted annual variables.
Univariate Test
Specifically, we adjust the values of tax avoidance measures by subtracting the corresponding value for the matched firm from that for the sample firm. For each tax avoidance measure, we require a constant sample with non-missing data across the event year window [-1, +2] , and thus the sample size varies across different tax avoidance measures.
An important premise of our hypothesis is that the tax avoidance level of the target firm must be sufficiently low to motivate hedge funds' attempts to improve tax planning.
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The "Adjusted Annual Values" section of Table 2 shows that in Year -1, the Current ETR (Cash ETR) has an average of 0.108 (0.143), suggesting that target firms have significantly higher effective tax rates than matched control firms prior to the intervention.
21
The two book-tax difference measures are significantly negative (-0.036 for MP_BTD and -0.021 for DD_BTD), indicating lower book-tax differences relative to control firms. Such tax inefficiency (as indicated by significantly positive ETRs and negative BTDs) may have attracted hedge fund activists' interest to promote a change. To test whether hedge funds target firms with low tax avoidance levels, we estimate the association between tax avoidance in Year t and the probability of being targeted by hedge fund activists in Year t+1 by adding our tax measures to the logistic regression model used by Brav et al. (2008) as described previously. We find (untabulated) that 20 We thank the original editor, Thomas Omer, for raising this point. 21 As we discussed previously, we adjust values of all variables by those of matched control firms and use the resulting adjusted values for our empirical analysis. Thus, all values of variables reported in this paper are adjusted values and statistical significance levels of these values indicate whether there are significant differences between target firms and matched control firms.
our two ETR measures are significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of being targeted.
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Taken together, our results are consistent with inefficient tax planning being a potential motivating factor for hedge funds to intervene.
Next, we turn to changes in adjusted tax avoidance rates after hedge fund activism events.
The "Changes in Adjusted Annual Values" section of Table 2 shows that target firms exhibit greater improvement in tax avoidance than matched control firms after the activist event.
Specifically, for both Current ETR and Cash ETR, the differences between the year prior to the intervention and the year after (-0.039 and -0.038, respectively) are negative and significant. We find that differences between the year prior to the intervention and year t+2 are even larger for both Current ETR and Cash ETR (-0.065 and -0.054, respectively), suggesting further increases in tax avoidance during year t+2. The univariate results for the book-tax difference measures generate similar inferences. The measures show similar increases in book-tax differences in both years following the intervention for both MP_BTD (0.079 and 0.078, respectively) and DD_BTD (0.025 and 0.019, respectively). In summary, univariate tests across all four tax avoidance measures support our hypothesis, indicating increases in tax avoidance following hedge fund intervention.
Direct Effects vs. Indirect Effects
Since hedge fund interventions often elicit profound and multi-dimensional changes in target firms (Brav et al. 2010 ), our results in Table 2 could be driven by either the direct effects of activism on tax avoidance as a result of improvements in tax planning, or by indirect effects arising from changes in the firm's operating performance, capital structure, and investments. For example, Brav et al. (2008) show that target firms experience significant increases in leverage, and the tax avoidance literature (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2010a Badertscher et al. , 2010b finds that the level of 22 The coefficients on the two BTD measures are negative and statistically insignificant.
leverage affects a firm's incentives for tax planning. Firms with more debt enjoy a larger interest tax shield that reduces income tax liabilities and may lower the need for tax planning or other tax shields (Badertscher et al. 2010a (Badertscher et al. , 2010b . Acknowledging this possibility, we conduct additional tests to explore to what extent the indirect effects of activism influence our findings of increases in tax avoidance. First, we examine whether changes in performance, leverage, and investments cause the changes in tax avoidance after the fund intervention. Second, we use a multivariate levels regression model to control for known tax determinants so that our variables of interest can better capture the direct effects of activism on tax. Finally, we investigate the impact of hedge fund activist characteristics, especially those indicating their interest or knowledge in tax efficiency.
Changes in Performance, Leverage and Investments after Hedge Fund Intervention
We first examine changes in the target firms' operating performance (measured by ROE), capital structure (measured by leverage), and investments (measured by PPE and intangible assets) to assess the possibility that changes in these variables lead to the increases in tax avoidance. Table 3 reports the mean adjusted annual levels of ROE, leverage, PPE, and intangible assets from event year -1 to event year +2 for target firms as well as the changes in these adjusted annual variables. Specifically, we adjust all variables by subtracting the corresponding value for the matched firm from that for the sample firm.
In the "Changes in Adjusted Annual Values" section of Table 3 , we find no significant changes in pre-tax ROE, implying that our results on tax avoidance should not be driven by changes in operating performance.
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However, we do find significant increases in leverage, similar to the findings in Brav et al. (2010) . Leverage has no direct effect on our tax measures, since interest expense is deductible for both book income and taxable income and our measures capture only non-conforming tax avoidance (Bernard 1984; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) .
However, leverage may be correlated with firm tax strategy due to the impact of a debt tax shield on a firm's incentives for tax planning (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2010a Badertscher et al. , 2010b . We find that target firms experience decreases in property, plant, and equipment (PPE), which is consistent with the findings in Brav et al. (2010) , suggesting that activism cuts slack for target firms by tightening monitoring in investment decisions. PPE is subject to nonconforming book and tax accounting rules and can be used to increase tax avoidance (e.g., using accelerated depreciation of PPE under tax accounting rules). Decreases in PPE allow for less reduction in tax liabilities, due to accelerated tax depreciation, and also lead to lower levels of tax avoidance. Hence, decreases in PPE following the intervention cannot explain our documented increases in tax avoidance.
Finally, we find no significant increases in intangible assets.
To rule out changes in firm fundamentals as alternative explanations for our results, we construct several control samples based on changes in four variables (ROE, leverage, PPE, and intangible assets) and compare changes in tax avoidance between our target sample and control samples. Specifically, we identify four separate control samples matched on changes in ROE, leverage, PPE, and intangible assets respectively. 24 We then compare changes in tax avoidance around hedge fund intervention between the target sample and each of the control samples.
Consistent with our prediction, the untabulated results indicate that target firms experience likely due to sample differences. For robustness, we analyze their sample (which is a subset of our sample) and find similar results. 24 We match target firms and control firms on only one dimension at a time (e.g., change in PPE) because very few control firms experience changes in more than one dimension similarly to the target firms.
significantly greater increases in tax avoidance than their control firms in each of these matching samples.
Alternatively, we can control for indirect effects using a multivariate framework by explicitly including these variables in the regression model. We report our multivariate results in the next two sub-sections.
Multivariate Test
In testing family owners' influence on tax avoidance, Chen et al. (2010) suggest the inclusion of a comprehensive set of variables in a levels regression model to control for indirect effects. Chen et al. (2010, 44, and 49-50) explain that these control variables are intended to capture the indirect effects on tax avoidance measures arising from firm characteristics and those caused by specific tax treatments that differ from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
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We follow their approach by including a comprehensive set of variables, so that the variables of interest (i.e., event year dummies) in the multivariate regressions are likely to capture the direct effects of hedge fund activism on tax avoidance.
One concern is that our regression equation includes several tax determinant variables that can be a part of the tax avoidance strategies promoted by hedge fund activists, and controlling for these variables could purge out some "direct effects" of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance, biasing against finding significant coefficients on our key variables of interest. However, as Chen et al. (2010, 49-50) note, controlling for tax tool variables is not "throwing the baby out with the bath water," in the sense that these variables simply control for the average tax avoidance associated with those variables. Our model only removes the average effects of these tax tools so that the year dummy variables still potentially capture the changes in firms' tax avoidance resulting from the direct effects.
We estimate Equation (1) We include a number of control variables that have been shown by prior literature to be potential determinants of tax avoidance (e.g., Manzon and Plesko 2002; Mills 1998; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2011a McGuire et al. , 2011b . Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as operating income (computed as pretax income minus extraordinary items) scaled by the lagged book value of equity, and measures a firm's financial performance.
Gupta and Newberry (1997) report a positive relation between ETRs and firm profitability. They suggest that higher income is associated with higher marginal tax rates, and hence firms with higher profits will tend to exhibit higher ETRs. However, Rego ( profitability and tax avoidance. They argue that more profitable firms have stronger incentives due to the larger potential savings and more resources to engage in tax avoidance. In addition, Manzon and Plesko (2002) and Rego (2003) propose that more profitable firms have lower costs of tax avoidance since they can make more efficient use of tax deductions, credits, and exemptions relative to less profitable firms, resulting in lower effective tax rates and greater book-tax differences.
Since interest expense is deductible for taxable income, while dividend payments are not, a firm's capital structure is an important determinant of its expected tax liability. We include a firm's Leverage (long term debt scaled by lagged total assets) to control for the effect of debt on firms' incentives in tax planning. As discussed earlier, since interest expenses are deductible for both book and tax incomes, nonconforming tax avoidance measures such as effective tax rates and book-tax differences will not capture tax avoidance resulting from changes in leverage (Bernard 1984; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 142) . However, the tax deductibility of the interest will have an impact on the firm's tax planning incentives. For instance, highly leveraged firms may have either a stronger motivation to avoid taxes in order to preserve cash to service the heavy debt burdens, or a weaker motivation due to the debt tax shield (Badertscher et al. 2010b ).
Utilization of prior operating loss carryforwards (NOL) should reduce current period tax burdens. To control for this effect, we follow Chen et al. (2010) and include ∆NOL, the change in a firm's tax loss carryforwards from prior to current period, scaled by lagged total assets. The association between ∆NOL and our tax avoidance measures depends on whether it results in nonconformity between taxable income and book income. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in NOL implies that firms are using NOLs to lower their taxable income. When taxable income is lower, book-tax differences (BTD) will be larger and effective tax rates (ETR) will be lower. On the other hand, an increase in NOL due to current period's loss should not affect current taxable income since its tax reduction benefits will be realized in future profitable years.
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Taken together, the average relation between ∆NOL and tax avoidance can be significantly negative.
Prior studies generally predict and find a negative relation between ∆NOL and BTD and a positive relation between ∆NOL and ETR. For example, Cooper and Knittel (2010) argue that those firms utilizing an NOL should have lower effective tax rates than their counterparts not using an NOL. Mackie (1999) suggests that the rising profitability during the 1990s allowed firms to effectively utilize NOLs and enjoy lower average tax rates during that time period. The variables Foreign Income, PPE, Intangible Assets, and Equity Income capture firm characteristics that by statute affect a firm's income tax liability. We include Foreign Income, the firm's foreign income scaled by lagged total assets, to control for book income that may not result in a current tax liability. This is because foreign profits are in general not subject to U.S.
tax until repatriated (e.g., Rego 2003) .
27
A firm's book income generally differs from its tax income because of different treatments of certain transactions. For instance, levels of depreciation expense calculated under book and tax rules are rarely equivalent, and therefore firms with higher levels of depreciable assets may exhibit greater book-tax differences simply attributable to heterogeneous statutory requirements. Accordingly, we include the firm's 26 In addition, such deferred tax benefits are not included in our ETR tax measures, because current tax expense and cash tax taxes paid do not contain deferred tax benefits. 27 Firms should recognize deferred tax expense on foreign earnings which are not considered permanently reinvested, but minimal guidance in GAAP regarding the definition in "permanently reinvested" results in wide variation in the application of this rule in practice.
property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged assets, PPE, as an explanatory variable.
Similarly, amortization rules for intangible assets vary between book and tax accounting rules.
In particular, purchased goodwill is tested for impairment under GAAP but amortized over 15 years under US tax rules. Similar to prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010) , we note the importance of including Intangible Assets (intangible assets scaled by lagged total assets) because of the statutory differences in cost recovery and asset valuation. Income from affiliated entities is included in book income when recognized under the equity method, but is not necessarily included in taxable income. Thus, we control for this book-tax difference by including in our regression the amount of Equity Income (equity income in earnings scaled by lagged assets).
We also control for Size (natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity) and MTB (market value of equity scaled by book value of equity). Political cost theory proposes that larger firms pay higher political costs, including taxes (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . Alternatively, larger firms have greater resources to influence the political process in their favor and to engage in tax planning (Siegfried 1972) . Growth firms may be more likely to purchase tax favored assets (e.g., Chen et al. 2010 ) and have more unrecovered capital for tax purposes, creating tax benefits through depreciation and amortization. On the other hand, mature firms may have more experience in tax planning. Finally, we include industry and year fixed effects to capture variations attributable to these sources.
After removing observations with missing values for the control variables or tax avoidance metrics, our regression analyses are performed on the remaining firm-years for each of the four tax avoidance measures with corresponding descriptive statistics reported in Panel A of 
MP_BTD).
The coefficient for DD_BTD (0.024) has an unchanged sign but is insignificant. We also find the changes in tax avoidance provide substantial economic benefits to target firms. The regression coefficients on our event year dummies reflect the average changes in our tax avoidance measures. For example, we find that target firms experience decreases in effective tax rates that range from 3.9 percent to 11.1 percent, which equates to dollar tax savings between $319,800 and $910,200 for an average firm, given that the mean pretax income of our sample is $8.2 million. 28 The changes in the first year (year +1) appear dramatic. Note also that the changes do not reverse in year +2, implying that hedge funds identify target firms whose tax under-avoidance can be improved in the short-term (within 2 years). Similarly, Brav et al. (2008) also report dramatic changes in target firms' policies (e.g. compensation and dividend payout) in year +1, indicating that activists could initiate and implement policy changes rather quickly. The large changes could potentially be due to measurement issues. However, we use four measures and find robust significant changes for each in Year +1. Hence, we believe the changes in Year +1 are not solely due to our empirical measures.
With regard to the coefficients on control variables, ROE is negatively associated with both Current ETR and Cash ETR, similar to the findings in Rego (2003) In summary, the results from the multivariate tests in Table 5 show that increases in tax avoidance following hedge fund interventions are not driven by the indirect effects arising from changes in firm characteristics following the interventions.
Impact of Hedge Fund Activists' Characteristics
To further strengthen the validity of our results, we extend our analysis by investigating whether changes in tax avoidance of target firms following fund intervention are related to activists' heterogeneity in incentives and abilities. To identify hedge funds' incentive, we search for indications of their interest and knowledge in tax planning from their filings. We download all the SEC 13D and 13D/A filings for our 2,981 hedge fund activist events (17,152 filings).
Using a full-text search program, we identify 98 events (involving 59 hedge funds) in which hedge fund activists exhibit their interest or knowledge in target firms' tax issues. Due to the opaque nature of tax planning and the potential risk associated with its tax strategy being ruled as improper Dhamapala 2006, 2009; Chen et al. 2010) , it is likely that many hedge fund activists refrain from explicitly expressing their interest in tax issues or disclosing detailed tax planning strategies in public filings.
29
To overcome the small sample problem, instead of only focusing on these 98 special cases, we assume that the hedge fund activists associated with these events have interest and knowledge in tax issues and are more likely to exert influence over tax planning of their target firms.
30
We also employ two other proxies for hedge funds' ability to implement tax changes.
Specifically, we conjecture that hedge funds with more activism experience and greater past success of inducing tax changes have more ability to promote changes in their target firms. The regression model for these tests is specified below: 
where ActivistChar represents Activists' Experience, Tax Avoidance Changes in Past Activist Events, and Activist Exhibiting Tax Interest or Knowledge respectively in separate tests. 29 We classify these interventions into the following five categories: (1) the activist states that she will discuss tax issues with managers; (2) the activist emphasizes the importance of tax efficiency in a specific business context (such as spin-off of a subsidiary in a tax efficient manner); (3) the activist applies advanced tax knowledge in her proposal to the target firm's manager to improve firm performance; (4) the activist explicitly suggests tax strategies; and (5) the activist indicates that she has either a tax director or has an external tax consultant. There are only around 20 cases in the fourth category. 30 We also compare these 98 cases with other cases targeted by the same hedge fund activists and find that the increases in tax avoidance levels associated with these 98 cases are greater than for other activist events (untabulated). In summary, our evidence shows that hedge fund activists differ systematically in their impact on target firms' tax avoidance.
31
Target firms of activists with greater past success or expertise in implementing tax changes experience greater increases in tax avoidance following intervention.
V. ADDITIONAL TESTS Changes in Tax Avoidance in Five Years after the Intervention
We extend the univariate analyses in Table 2 to examine the longer-term persistence of changes in tax avoidance. Similar to Table 2 , we require a constant sample across the period in an attempt to mitigate the survivorship bias. We also adjust all values of tax avoidance measures for the levels of the propensity-score matched control firms. Table 7 shows that the decreases in effective tax rates do not reverse across the ETR measures of tax avoidance. For instance, the change from event year -1 to event year +5 is -0.081 for the Current ETR, -0.066 for the Cash ETR, 0.086 for the MP_BTD, and 0.043 for the DD_BTD, respectively, all significant at 5 percent level. Results in Table 7 show that, in general, changes in tax avoidance after hedge fund intervention do not reverse at least in the intermediate-term, indicating that hedge funds' influence on target firms' tax planning is not limited to short-term only.
Is Increased Tax Avoidance Associated with Increased Use of Tax Sheltering
We further analyze whether the increased tax avoidance is associated with target firms' increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax planning strategies such as tax sheltering. 31 We also conduct changes analysis, where we regress changes in tax avoidance on hedge fund characteristics and changes in control variables in Equation (2). Changes in both tax avoidance measures and control variables are computed relative to the levels in year -1 and also adjusted for the corresponding values of control firms identified by propensity score matching. We find that all three hedge fund characteristics are associated with changes in tax avoidance. In particular, Activist's Experience is positively and significantly associated with changes in tax avoidance. Taken together, we conclude that both the level and change analyses provide evidence linking changes in corporate tax avoidance around intervention to hedge fund characteristics.
The costs and benefits to engaging in a tax shelter are a frequent subject of interest in the literature. Graham and Tucker (2006) find that tax shelters provide firms with tax savings.
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) Using the sheltering probability estimates from Wilson (2009) and Lisowksy (2010), we examine whether hedge fund activism is associated with increased probabilities of tax sheltering behaviors.
33
Untabulated results show no evidence that target firms are more likely to engage in tax sheltering after hedge fund intervention.
34
Our results, therefore, suggest that the greater tax savings achieved by target firms likely result from more efficient tax planning rather than the use of egregious and risky tax evasion strategies.
35 32 We thank Petro Lisowsky for kindly sharing the sheltering score estimates with us. 33 Even though the use of tax sheltering might be pervasive, sheltering activities are notoriously difficult to detect (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006) . Academic studies on tax sheltering (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009 ) usually rely on court documents and press reports to identify tax shelter firms and the samples tend to be small. For instance, Wilson (2009) identifies only 59 shelter firms between 1975 and 2007. 34 The univariate event-study analysis shows a slight decrease (about 1.9 percent) in the average industry-adjusted estimated sheltering probability for target firms after the intervention. After controlling for firm characteristics, the changes in the sheltering probabilities become insignificant in multivariate regressions. 35 Our ability to make inferences is limited by the extent to which these sheltering models capture the profile of the broader set of tax shelter participants. Therefore, this analysis of sheltering activities is preliminary and we caution readers not to over-interpret our results.
Do Hedge Fund Activists Simply Pick Target Firms that are Already Experiencing
Increases in Tax Avoidance? Brav et al. (2008) investigate whether hedge fund activists simply identify undervalued targets without adding to firms' fundamental values. Using various methodologies, they conclude that the average positive market response to an announcement of fund intervention is not likely driven by the stock picking effect. In our setting, we face a similar problem: hedge funds may simply pick target firms that were already experiencing increases in tax avoidance.
Presumably, these target firms might continue the trend in tax avoidance even without hedge fund intervention. In previous sections, we show that changes in tax avoidance after hedge fund intervention are related to hedge fund characteristics such as past success and expertise in implementing tax changes. These results are inconsistent with a pure "stock picking effect", and are more consistent with the "direct effects" of hedge fund activism on tax avoidance. To further strengthen our analysis, in this section, we conduct a trend analysis of tax avoidance prior to hedge fund intervention. If hedge funds simply cherry-pick target firms that are expected to continue to increase their tax avoidance, then we should expect target firms to exhibit an increasing trend for tax avoidance in years before fund intervention. We estimate the following regression to test the trends of tax avoidance prior to hedge fund intervention; (3) where TIME measures the number of years prior to the event year 0 (e.g. -10 to -1), and all other variables are as previously defined in Equation ( respectively. We find significantly positive coefficients on TIME for the ETR measures regardless of the event window length we use. For the BTD measures, the coefficients are either zero or negative, and mostly significant. Focusing on the period of [-5,-1] , the coefficients on TIME for the Current ETR, Cash ETR, MP_BTD, and DD_BTD measures are 0.014, 0.017, -0.011, and -0.007, respectively, with all coefficients being significant.
36
The positive coefficients for the ETR measures and the negative coefficients for the BTD measures imply that on average the target firms were experiencing decreases in tax avoidance prior to hedge fund intervention.
We conduct the same analyses for the matched control firms and do not find similar trends. The finding that the target firms do not continue the decrease in the levels of tax avoidance but instead increase their levels of tax avoidance after hedge fund intervention provides additional evidence on a direct effect of hedge fund intervention.
Other Robustness Checks
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) To address the possibility that our results are driven by time invariant unobservable factors, we include firm-level fixed effects in Equation (1) and Table 5 . We find the results are similar to our original results.
Finally, to mitigate survivorship bias we use the event window [-1, +2] in our tabulated analyses. One potential limitation with this approach arises from possible changes in tax strategy in the period prior to the intervention, as firm management may suspect a future activism event.
36 These untabulted results are available upon request.
To control for this possibility, in untabulated tests we extend the event window from years [-1, +2] to years [-2, +2] and our conclusions remain similar.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We extend the tax avoidance literature by examining the impact of an increasingly important class of shareholders -activist hedge funds on corporate tax avoidance. A main goal for hedge fund activists is to identify under-performing firms and adopt intervention and monitoring activities to improve the target firms' value. We propose that taxes can be an important consideration for hedge fund activists when they push target firms for value improvements, and that hedge fund activists' effective monitoring of effort-averse firm managers would improve the target firms' tax planning. Using propensity-score matching to construct a control sample, we find that prior to hedge fund intervention our target firms exhibit significantly lower tax avoidance than their control firms, as measured by both effective tax rates (ETRs) and book-tax differences (BTDs). In addition, we find the target firms experience significant increases in tax avoidance following activist funds' intervention.
An important concern for our research is that increases in tax avoidance may not come directly from hedge fund activists' influence on corporate tax planning but could arise indirectly from other corporate changes (e.g., operating performance, leverage, and investment decisions)
induced by the activism. To control for these indirect effects, we conduct several analyses. We first identify control samples matched on target firms' changes in operating performance, leverage, PPE and intangible assets, and we find these control firms do not exhibit similar increases in tax avoidance as target firms do. We then use multivariate models with controls for a comprehensive set of potential tax determinants variables suggested in prior literature. To control for selection bias and market-wide changes of tax avoidance, we adjust values of all variables in our study by those of control firms identified through propensity score matching. We find consistent results under all these empirical methods. In addition, we find that increases in tax avoidance are associated with hedge funds' prior track record of implementing tax changes, and their interest and knowledge in tax planning as indicated in their SEC filings. Taken as a whole the results suggest that our findings of improvements in tax avoidance in target firms are likely due to direct effects of hedge fund intervention.
One limitation of our study is that, while we find robust support for increases in tax avoidance following hedge fund intervention events, we do not explicitly identify the tax mechanism underlying the changes. Unraveling the "black box" of tax strategies used to improve tax efficiency is difficult, if not impossible. This empirical challenge leads the most recent review on the tax literature to conclude that "the field cannot explain the variation in tax avoidance very well" (Hanlon and Heizman 2010). While we provide anecdotal evidence on some specific tax strategies suggested by hedge fund activists in public filings, firms generally refrain from disclosing their tax mechanisms in details, possibly out of concern with drawing the IRS's attention. Hence, future studies might seek to identify these specific tax strategies by using alternative methodologies such as conducting surveys of hedge fund activists.
APPENDIX A Anecdotal Evidence on Hedge Fund Activists Targeting Corporate Tax Planning Efficiency
Lawndale Capital Management vs. Westmore Land Coal Co:
In September, 1996, hedge fund activist, Lawndale Capital Management Inc., in its Schedule 13D filing against its target firm, Westmore Land Coal Co, disclosed that it had discussed with the company's management and board of directors about strategies to maximize shareholder value. The discussion included issues on using the company's net operating loss and tax carryforwards for tax benefits. Source: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/106455/0000935836-96-000034.txt
Third Point vs. Cypress Semiconductor:
In August, 2007, Hedge fund activist, Third Point LLC., acquired more than 5.1 percent stake at Cypress Semiconductor and demanded the company address its undervaluation quickly. Specifically, Third Point LLC. insisted that there are tax-efficient ways to expedite the process of selling off Cypress Semiconductor's stake in Sunpower and the company should immediately explore them. Source: http://www.secinvestor.com/2007/08/10/Cypress+50+Undervalued+CY.aspx
New Mountain Ventures vs. National Fuel Gas:
In October, 2007, hedge fund activist New Mountain Ventures stated that it plans to nominate its own slate of directors for the board of its target firm, National Fuel Gas. One of New Mountain Ventures' demands for National Fuel Gas was to "change the ownership structure of some of its business in a way that would cut its tax bill." Source: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-21663005.html
Greenlight Capital vs. MI Developments:
In April, 2008, hedge fund activist, Greenlight Capital, Inc. publicly announced that it is not in favor of the Reorganization Proposal that its target firm, MI Developments Inc., received from entities affiliated with Mr. Frank Stronach and intends to vote against it. One major concern for Greenlight Capital, Inc. about this reorganization is the tax consequence. Specifically, Greenlight Capital, Inc. stated "The Term Sheet does not disclose the tax effects of the transaction on any of the parties. The Reorganization Proposal presents the following tax issues that should be evaluated, quantified and disclosed both as to the benefit to Mr. Stronach and as to the cost to MID and MID shareholders:" Greenlight Capital, Inc. discussed the tax issues in detail including issues on loss carryforwards, tax attributes of debt (historic tax basis), taxable foreign gains, capital gain taxes, Canadian non-resident withholding taxes, etc. Source: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040272/000136231008002102/c73026exv13.htm
APPENDIX B Variable Definitions
Current ETR Current effective tax rate, which equals total income tax expense (#16) minus deferred income tax expense (#50), divided by pretax net income (#170) minus special items (#17) in year t. We truncate the values at 0 and 1.
Cash ETR Cash effective tax rate, which equals cash taxes paid (#317), divided by pretax net income (#170) minus special items (#17) in year t. We truncate the values at 0 and 1.
MP_BTD
Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference, which equals U.S. domestic income (#272) minus U.S. domestic taxable income minus state income taxes (#173) minus other income taxes (#211) minus equity in earnings (#55), scaled by lagged assets (#6). U.S. domestic taxable income is estimated as the current federal tax expense (#63) divided by the statutory maximum corporate tax rate.
DD_BTD
Desai-Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference, which equals the residual from the following firm fixed-effect regression: BT i,t = β 1 TA i,t + μ i + ε i,t , where BT is the Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference, TA is total accruals measured using the cash flow method per Hribar and Collins (2002) . Both variables are scaled by lagged total assets and are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent levels for regression purposes. Lagged Market to book Market to book ratio at the beginning of the year, measured as market value of equity (#199 × #25), and scaled by book value of equity (#60).
Lagged Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#199 × #25) at the beginning of the year. This table reports the mean adjusted annual levels of tax avoidance for target firms around hedge fund activist events from event year -1 to event year +2 with event year 0 being the year of the intervention announcement as well as the changes in these adjusted annual variables. Adjusted values are computed as the differences between the levels of event firms and the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table IV of Brav et al. (2008) . For each tax avoidance measure, we require a constant sample with non-missing data across the event window [-1, +2] . In the top section, we test whether the tax avoidance levels of target firms are statistically different from those of control firms in each event year. In the bottom section, we test whether the changes in tax avoidance levels of target firms differ significantly from those of control firms. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (one-sided), respectively. Appendix B contains the variable definitions. This table reports the mean adjusted annual levels of performance, leverage, and investments for target firms around hedge fund activist events from event year -1 to event year +2 with event year 0 being the year of the intervention announcement as well as the changes in these adjusted annual values. Adjusted values are computed as the differences between the levels of event firms and the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table IV of Brav et al. (2008) . For each firm characteristic measure, we require a constant sample with non-missing data across the event window [-1, +2] . In the top section, we test whether the performance, leverage, and investment levels of target firms are statistically different from those of control firms in each event year. In the bottom section, we test whether the changes in performance, leverage, and investment levels of target firms differ significantly from those of control firms. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (one-sided), respectively. Appendix B contains the variable definitions. [-1, +2] with required data, where event year 0 is the year of the intervention announcement. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of variables used in the multivariate regressions. We compute and report adjusted values that are computed as the differences between the levels of the event firms and the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table IV 1.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
TABLE 5 Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Tax Avoidance after Hedge Fund Intervention
This table presents the results on changes in tax avoidance of target firms around hedge fund activist events. The sample includes firm-years of target firms in the event window [-1, +2] with required data, where event year 0 is the year of the intervention announcement. For all dependent and control variables in the regressions, we adjust their values by the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table  IV of Brav et al. (2008) . Intercept, industry and year dummies are included but not reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Appendix B contains the variable definitions. This table presents the results on the impact of hedge fund activists' characteristics on changes in tax avoidance of target firms around the hedge fund activist events. The sample includes firm-years of target firms in the event window [-1, +2] with required data, where event year 0 is the year of the intervention announcement. Activist's Experience is measured by the number of intervention events initiated by the hedge fund activist during the past five years. (Activist's Experience is divided by 100 for exposition.) Tax Avoidance Changes in Past Activist Events is measured by the average changes in tax avoidance in the firms targeted by the hedge fund activist during the past five years. Activist Exhibiting Tax Interest/Knowledge is an indicator variable if the hedge fund activist has exhibited interest or knowledge in tax issues in one of her 13D or 13D/A filings during the sample period. For all dependent and control variables in the regressions, we adjust their values by the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table IV of Brav et al. (2008) . Intercept, industry and year dummies are included but not reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Appendix B contains the variable definitions. This table reports the mean adjusted annual levels of tax avoidance for target firms around hedge fund activist events from event year -1 to event year +5 with event year 0 being the year of the intervention announcement, as well as the changes in these adjusted annual values. Adjusted values are computed as the differences between the levels of event firms and the levels of the matched control firms. Control firms are identified as firms that have never been targeted by hedge funds during our sample period but have the closest propensity scores as target firms. Propensity score is the predicted probability of becoming a hedge fund activism target in the next year, estimated from the model as in Table IV of Brav et al. (2008) . For each tax avoidance measure, we require a constant sample with non-missing data across the event window [-1, +5] . In the top section, we test whether the tax avoidance levels of target firms are statistically different from those of control firms in each event year. In the bottom section, we test whether the changes in tax avoidance levels of target firms differ significantly from those of control firms. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (one-sided), respectively. Appendix B contains the variable definitions. 
